



2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Press Release

3-28 May 2010

The Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

New York. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet at the United Nations in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010. The President-elect of the Conference is Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan (Philippines).

Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the NPT provides for a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years. States parties reaffirmed and strengthened the implementation of this provision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2005.

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goals of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.

Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. The NPT has demonstrated its effectiveness as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Adherence to the Treaty by 189 States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, renders the Treaty the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement.

The Review Conference is expected to consider a number of issues, including those discussed at the 2005 Conference: universality of the Treaty; nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures; nuclear non-proliferation; including compliance with Treaty provisions, the promoting and strengthening of safeguards, measures to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy; safety and security; regional disarmament and non-proliferation; implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty; measures to further strengthen the review process; and ways to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament education.

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2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Biographical note

3-28 May 2010

Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan **President-elect of the 2010 NPT Review Conference**



Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan is the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations. A career diplomat with extensive experience in the United Nations, Ambassador Cabactulan was Assistant Secretary for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila prior to his appointment by Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as envoy to the United Nations.

Ambassador Cabactulan was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Arab Emirates from 2004-2009. He also served at the Philippine Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and twice at the Philippine Mission to the United Nations in New York (1986-1990 and 1995-2000). He was also assigned to the Philippine Embassy in Brussels and the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney.


In Manila, Ambassador Cabactulan served as Executive Director of the Office of United Nations and Other International Organizations and the Office of Consular Affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs. He also served as Special Assistant and Senior Special Assistant to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines.

Ambassador Cabactulan has extensive experience in negotiations. He led the Group of 77 and China in the negotiations on economic and related issues at the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Population Commission, United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Development Program in 1989 and in 1996.

While serving in Abu Dhabi in 2006, Ambassador Cabactulan received a Presidential Citation from President Arroyo for his role in the repatriation of hundreds of Filipinos during the Israel-Lebanon crisis.

Ambassador Cabactulan obtained his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees in Political Science and a Certificate in Development Economics from the University of the Philippines. He has a diploma with merit for Commercial Policy from the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in Geneva. Before joining the Foreign Service, he worked at the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) in Manila as Staff Economist.

Ambassador Cabactulan is married with two children.



2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Background

3-28 May 2010

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet at the United Nations in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010. The President-elect of the Conference is Ambassador Libran Nuevas Cabactulan of the Philippines.

The Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisages a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

At the 2010 Review Conference, States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2005.

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.

Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since its entry into force, the NPT has been the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Adherence to the Treaty by 189 States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, renders the Treaty the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement.

Since the 2005 Review Conference, one state has through succession joined the Treaty: Montenegro (2006). India, Israel and Pakistan have not yet chosen to join the Treaty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, has not yet decided to re-join the Treaty.

History of the Treaty

From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it has been apparent that the development of nuclear capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and materials for weapons purposes. Thus the problem of preventing such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to create an international system enabling all States to have access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective, due to serious political differences between the major Powers. By then, both the United States and the former Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their stockpiles.

In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, urged that an international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was charged with the dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology.

IAEA technical assistance activities began in 1958. An interim safeguards system for small nuclear reactors, put in place in 1961, was replaced in 1964 by a system covering larger installations and, over the following years, was expanded to include additional nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/66 and re-

visions). Subsequently, efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system culminated in the approval of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.

Within the framework of the United Nations, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early as 1957 and gained significant momentum in the early 1960s. The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of international behaviour had become clear by the mid-1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, enable cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. The Treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Accordingly, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, States parties to the Treaty agreed—without a vote—on the Treaty's indefinite extension, and decided that review conferences should continue to be held every five years.

The NPT Review Process

Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held at five-year intervals since the Treaty went into effect in 1970. Each conference has sought to find agreement on a final declaration that would assess the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and make recommendations on measures to further strengthen it. Consensus on a Final Declaration was reached at the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conferences, but could not be achieved in 1980, 1990, and 1995. Differences centred on the question of whether or not the nuclear-weapon States had sufficiently fulfilled the requirements of article VI (nuclear disarmament) as well as on issues such as nuclear testing, qualitative nuclear-weapon developments, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon States, and on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference had two objectives: to review the Treaty's operation and to decide on its extension. While not being able to agree on a consensus review of the Treaty's implementation, States parties adopted without a vote a package of decisions. These decisions consisted of (a) elements for a strengthened review process for the Treaty, (b) principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and (c) the indefinite extension of the Treaty; as well as a resolution on the Middle East.

The 2000 Review Conference demonstrated the strength of the new review mechanism and the concept of accountability which had been agreed upon when States parties accepted the "permanence of the Treaty" and extended it indefinitely. For the first time in 15 years, States parties successfully concluded their deliberations with agreement on a Final Document that assessed the Treaty's past performance and on a number of key issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, nuclear safety and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Final Document reaffirmed the central role of the NPT in ongoing global efforts to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and reflected consensus language dealing with virtually all the major aspects of the Treaty. In addition, after noting that the Conference deplored the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998, the Document reaffirmed that any new State party to the Treaty will be accepted only as a non-nuclear-weapon State, regardless of its nuclear capabilities.

The most critical and delicate achievement was the incorporation in the Document of a set of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty. These steps provide benchmarks by which future progress by the States parties can be measured. One of the most frequently quoted among them is the nuclear weapon States' agreement, for the first time, to undertake unequivocally to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

The 2005 Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a substantive outcome, though States parties were able to engage in useful discussions on a range of issues. Some key disagree-

ments that contributed to this outcome included whether disarmament or non-proliferation should be prioritized and the status of past decisions and agreements, including those reached by the 1995 and 2000 Conferences.

Towards the 2010 Review Conference

The Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Conference, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 61/70 of 6 December 2006, held three sessions in the period April 2007 to May 2009. As in the previous review cycle, the Preparatory Commission devoted the majority of its meetings to substantive preparation for the Conference and considered principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. In this context, the Committee took into account the outcomes of previous Review Conferences, including the 2000 Conference, the decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, as well as developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.

The Committee agreed to nearly all of the organizational and procedural arrangements for the 2010 Conference, including its provisional agenda. The Committee also agreed to the draft rules of procedure, the elections of the President and other officers, the date and venue, financing, the nomination of a Secretary-General, background documentation, and the chairpersons of the three Main Committees to be established at the Conference. Accordingly, Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, namely, the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (Zimbabwe); Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, namely, the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (Ukraine); and that Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, namely, the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Japan). The Committee decided to defer consideration of the final document to the Review Conference.

According to the agreement reached in 2000, the Preparatory Committee was expected to make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference. Despite devoting several meetings toward this end, due to the persistence of divergent views, the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the substantive issues under consideration.

The Review Conference is expected to consider a number of issues, including those discussed at the 2005 Conference: universality of the Treaty; nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures; nuclear non-proliferation, including the promoting and strengthening of safeguards; measures to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy, safety and security; regional disarmament and non-proliferation; implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty; measures to further strengthen the review process; and ways to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament education.



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Chronology

3-28 May 2010

Chronology of events relating to the NPT since May 2005

2–27 May 2005

The Seventh NPT Review Conference was held in New York. The Conference was unable to agree to a substantive outcome and adopted a Final Document that only outlined the procedural arrangements and proceedings of the Conference.

8 July 2005

The Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material adopted an amendment, extending obligations under the Convention to cover nuclear facilities.

18 July 2005

India and the United States issued a joint statement, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards and the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

19 September 2005

The Six-Party Talks agreed to a Joint Statement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

21–23 September 2005

The fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was held in New York. States parties adopted a Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the CTBT.

27 April 2006

The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1673 extending the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for two years.

31 July 2006

The Security Council adopted resolution 1696, in which it demanded that the Islamic Republic of Iran suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities.

1 June 2006

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission published its report entitled "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms".

3 June 2006

Montenegro succeeded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

8 September 2006

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty).

9 October 2006

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its first nuclear explosive test.

14 October 2006

The Security Council adopted resolution 1718, in which it imposed sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in response to the 9 October nuclear test explosion.

27 December 2006

The Security Council adopted resolution 1737, in which it decided that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall suspend specified nuclear-related activities and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution imposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

3 January 2007

Former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former Defence Secretary William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn published an article in the *Wall Street Journal* entitled "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons". This article inspired editorial from former Statesmen in Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Poland.

13 February 2007

The Six-Party Talks agreed to initial actions for the implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement.

24 March 2007

The Security Council adopted resolution 1747, in which it imposed additional sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its nuclear programme.

30 April 2007

The revised text of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was presented by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation at an event to also launch the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

25 June 2007

UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Margaret Beckett, delivered a speech entitled "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?" at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Conference.

7 July 2007

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism entered into force, after opening for signature on 13 April 2005.

18 July 2007

The IAEA verified that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shut down its nuclear facilities.

21 August 2007

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA agreed to a work plan, which provided procedures and a timeline for resolving outstanding issues.

3 October 2007

The Six-Party Talks agreed to second-phase actions for the implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement.

3 March 2008

The Security Council adopted resolution 1803, in which it imposed additional sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its nuclear programme.

21 March 2008

In a speech in Cherbourg, French President Sarkozy announced a number of nuclear disarmament measures, including a reduction of its airborne component by one-half, limiting its entire arsenal to fewer than 300 warheads, de-targeting and new transparency steps.

8 April 2008

Australian former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Sir Gustav Nossal, former Government Minister Dr

Barry Jones, former Defence Force chief General Peter Gration, former chief of the army and former governor of Western Australia Lieutenant-General John Sanderson and Associate Professor Tilman Ruff published an article entitled "Imagine there's no bomb" in the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

25 April 2008

The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1810 extending the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for three years.

26 June 2008

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear programme to the chair of the Six-Party Talks.

27 June 2008

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea demolished the cooling tower of its 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon.

30 June 2008

Former UK Foreign Secretaries Lord Douglas Hurd, Sir Malcom Rifkind, Lord David Owen and Former NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson published an article in *The Times* supporting the campaign for a non-nuclear weapons world.

24 July 2008

Former Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, Former Foreign Minister and current President of Italian Chamber of Deputies Gianfranco Fini, Former Minister for European Affairs Giorgio La Malfa, Former Defence Minister Arturo Parisi and former Secretary General of Pugwash Francesco Calogero published an open letter in the *Corriere della Sera* calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

1 August 2008

The IAEA Board of Governors approved by consensus a safeguards agreement for India, which would apply safeguards to India's designated civilian nuclear facilities. The IAEA and India signed the agreement on 2 February 2009.

6 September 2008

The Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to an exemption to its guidelines to allow for the transfer of certain nuclear-related items to India.

24 September 2008

The Fourth Joint Ministerial Meeting in support of the CTBT convened in New York and issued a joint statement that was endorsed by 96 States.

27 September 2008

The Security Council adopted resolution 1835, in which it called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply fully with its obligations under the respective resolutions of the Security Council.

24 October 2008

The Secretary-General announced his Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament.

5 December 2008

At the initiative of France, the European Union presented to the United Nations General Assembly a set of initiatives related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

13 January 2009

Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former President Richard von Weizsaecker, Former Federal Minister Egon Bahr and Former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher published "For a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: A German View" in the *International Herald Tribune*.

21 March 2009

The Treaty on the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Semipalatinsk Treaty) entered into force.

1 April 2009

The Russian Federation and the United States issued a joint statement in which they agreed to negotiate a replacement to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

3 April 2009

Former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and former President Lech Wałęsa published an article entitled "The Unthinkable Becomes Thinkable: Towards Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

5 April 2009

During a speech in Prague, US President Barack Obama expressed the commitment of the United States "to seek the peace and security of world without nuclear weapons."

11 April 2009

Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone proposed "11 benchmarks" for global nuclear disarmament, which include steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States and by all States, in addition to measures to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

25 May 2009

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its second nuclear test explosion.

4 June 2009

Former Norwegian Presidents Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kåre Willoch and Kjell Magne Bondevik, and former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg published an article entitled "A Nuclear Weapon-Free World" in *Aftenposten*.

12 June 2009

The Security Council adopted resolution 1874, in which it imposed additional sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in response to the 25 May nuclear test explosion.

29 June 2009

The Global Zero campaign published a draft action plan to achieve the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2030.

16 July 2009

The United Kingdom released a report entitled "The Road to 2010", in which it proposed a three-stage process to enable further progress toward nuclear disarmament, including transparency and control, arms reductions and steps to zero.

14 August 2009

The Treaty on the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) entered into force.

24 September 2009

The Security Council adopted resolution 1887 during its first summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

24–25 September 2009

The sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was held in New York and adopted a Final Declaration.

1 October 2009

The E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to three "understandings" with respect to addressing issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme.

14 October 2009

Former French Prime Ministers Alain Juppe and Michel Rocard, Former Defence Minister Alain Richard, and retired General Bernard Norlain published an article entitled "For Global Nuclear Disarmament, the Only Means to Prevent Anarchic Proliferation" in *Le Monde*.

2 November 2009

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea reportedly completed the restoration of its radio-chemistry laboratory (reprocessing plant) at Yongbyon.

2 December 2009

Former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, former Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep, former Defence and Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo and former Justice Minister Frits Korthals Altes published an article entitled "We must play an active role to establish a nuclear weapon free world" in *NRC Handelsblad*.

5 December 2009

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms expired.

8 December 2009

The Secretary-General announced his Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

15 December 2009

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament released its report entitled "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers".

2-4 February 2010

The Global Zero campaign convened a summit in Paris at which it brought together 200 international political, military, business, and faith figures to support the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons.

19 February 2010

Former Belgian Foreign Ministers Willy Claes and Louis Michel, and former Prime Ministers Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guy Verhofstadt, published an article entitled "Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World" in *De Standaard*.

5 March 2010

Fortieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT.

26 March 2010

Announcement by the Russian Federation and the United States of America that they have agreed to a successor to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START).

8 April 2010

The Russian Federation and the United States signed the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, under which they would be required to limit their deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their strategic delivery systems to 800, of which 700 may be deployed.

12-13 April 2010

The United States convened a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., which agreed to a work plan containing voluntary measures to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.

13 April 2010

The Russian Federation and the United States signed a new protocol to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement of 2000, which provides for the disposition of 34 tons of plutonium in each country declared excess of military needs.



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IAEA

3-28 May 2010

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use. The Agency is led by Director General Yukiya Amano.

The Agency works with its 151 Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. Through technical cooperation programmes the Agency assists its Member States and promotes the exchange of scientific and technical information between them. The IAEA's work also includes setting the framework for cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an international nuclear safety and security regime and verifying States' fulfilment of their non-proliferation undertakings.

The IAEA Secretariat is headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational liaison and regional offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto, Canada; and Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA runs or supports research centres and scientific laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Monaco; and Trieste, Italy.

The IAEA Secretariat is a team of 2200 multi-disciplinary professional and support staff from more than 90 countries.

The IAEA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The IAEA is not a party to the Treaty but is entrusted with key roles and responsibilities under it. The IAEA's safeguards system functions as a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community if and when the need arises.

Under the NPT, the IAEA has specific roles as the international safeguards inspectorate and as a multilateral channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology:

NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfil the non-proliferation commitment they have made, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

NPT Article IV: The Agency facilitates and provides a channel for endeavours aimed at "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

The Agency, through its technical cooperation programme, aims to promote tangible socio-economic impacts in its Member States, by supporting the use of appropriate nuclear science and technology to address major sustainable development priorities at the national, regional and interregional levels. The programme concentrates on six thematic areas — human health, agricultural productivity and food security, water resources management, environmental pro-

tection, physical and chemical applications, and sustainable energy development, together with a cross-cutting thematic area — safety and security — and supports the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Safeguards Status

The 2008 Safeguards Statement, the most recent Statement available, notes that safeguards were applied for 163 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Eighty-four States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. As of 31 December 2008, 84 States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. Of these, 44 States had significant nuclear activities.

As of the end of 2008, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of that Treaty.

Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five States.

By the end of 2009, three quarters of the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements had signed Additional Protocols and more than half of the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements had Additional Protocols in force. Moreover, nearly three quarters of the countries with nuclear material under safeguards had Additional Protocols in force.

A detailed description of the Agency's safeguards system is available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf.

A summary of the status of States' safeguards agreements is available at: <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2008-tables.pdf> and at <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html>.

Safeguards implementation

Safeguards implementation involved both activities carried out in the field and at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna. The latter activities included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources. In implementing in-field activities, the Secretariat carried out 1691 inspections, 473 design information verifications and 122 complementary accesses utilizing approximately 11 359 calendar-days in the field for verification in these States.

Comprehensive safeguards agreement

Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Additional Protocols

Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited.

The implementation of additional protocols is essential to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. One of the greatest challenges for the Agency is

to be able to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the Agency's ability to do so is limited.

The Model Additional Protocol equips the Agency with important supplementary tools which provide the Agency with broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Integrated safeguards

Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency's safeguards obligations.

Integrated safeguards were implemented during the whole of 2008 in 25 States: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. Integrated safeguards were implemented for part of 2008 in Chile, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Palau and the Republic of Korea. In addition, integrated safeguards approaches were developed and approved for Cuba, Luxembourg and Uruguay and were under development for Armenia, Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden.

Developments in Safeguards Implementation

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Since December 2002, the Agency has not implemented safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and, therefore, cannot draw any safeguards conclusion. In April 2009, the Agency's inspectors left the DPRK after the DPRK ceased all cooperation with the Agency. The Agency is no longer able to implement the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in the DPRK.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

The Agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the Agency with the necessary cooperation.

The necessary cooperation includes, among other things, implementation of relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, implementation of the Additional Protocol and of modified Code 3.1, as well as clarification of issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

The Syrian Arab Republic

Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. As a consequence, the Agency has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those sites since the previous report to the Board of Governors. Full cooperation is also needed from Syria to facilitate the resolution of issues concerning the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor.



2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Treaty Text

3-28 May 2010

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-

dependence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At inter-

vals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated. Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.